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I. INTRODUCTION
“Here, corporate law is an industry that is important unto itself, and we
know that if we are perceived as unfair, it matters.”1

I

MAGINE this scenario. You, a buy-side mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) attorney, are approached to guide Company A through its
acquisition of Company B. You navigate Company A through signing
a confidentiality agreement, sifting through the initial disclosure of financial information and schedules, and negotiating a draft agreement.2 This
purchase agreement contains conditions precedent to closing; other representations and warranties on some of the disclosed information; a damages provision; a capped, sole-remedy indemnity; and a standard
representations and warranties insurance (RWI) policy for several issues.3
The deal is proceeding according to plan; however, mere days before closing, your deal team begins to seriously doubt some of the warranted information even though Company B continues to defend their accuracy.
What do you advise Company A to do? One option would be to advise
the client to walk away from the deal, but this could lead to break-up fees
or litigation by the seller.4 Another option would be to negotiate a
purchase price adjustment from Company B, but this strategy becomes
unworkable if Company B continues to claim the information is accurate
and that Company A is contractually bound to close.5 A final option
1. John Gapper, Capitalist Punishment, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2005), https://www.ft
.com/content/8561245e-7032-11d9-b572-00000e2511c8 [Permalink unavailable] (quoting
Chancellor Leo E. Strine as he discusses the Supreme Court of Delaware’s balancing act
when making judicial decisions).
2. See Asset Acquisition: Overview, PRAC. L. CORP. & SEC., https://1.next.westlaw
.com/Document/Ibb0a875eef0511e28578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html [Permalink unavailable] (last visited Sept. 14, 2019) (detailing the process for a typical asset purchase
agreement).
3. See id.
4. See Charles Whitehead, Sandbagging: Default Rules and Acquisition Agreements,
36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1081, 1083 (2011) (discussing the options available to a buyer instead
of closing). While walking away from the deal is a viable option in many transactions,
parties may not agree that the representations or warranties are in breach. In addition,
there may be ramifications as far as break-up fees or potential litigation, since a seller can
sue on the theory that it met the conditions of closing and the buyer breached. See Joanna
Bliss et al., Breaking Up Is Hard to Do and Must be Done Carefully, WEIL GOTSHAL 2–3
(Oct. 2008), https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/pe_alert_oct_2008.pdf [https://perma
.cc/GW7F-AH47] (discussing the available contractual provisions a buyer may be bound by
if it fails to close the transaction).
5. See Bliss et al., supra note 4, at 2–3. In addition, some agreements have a survival
clause that prevents representations or warranties from surviving the closing, forcing a
party to either begin a legal action prior to closing or waive those rights by closing. See
Byron F. Egan et al., Contractual Limitations on Seller Liability in M&A Agreements,
JACKSON WALKER 27 (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.jw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/1790
.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4HJ-DLAR] (discussing Delaware purchase agreements and the
ability to contractually terminate representations and warranties at closing).
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would be to close the deal and pursue the indemnity because your agreement doesn’t mention any buyer reliance or knowledge requirement, but
this also has drawbacks of recovery risk and any RWI policy potentially
excluding coverage of the claim.6
The viability of this last path for Company A, which is commonly referred to as sandbagging, has been seriously called into question by a recent Supreme Court of Delaware case, Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v.
Campbell.7 Both the majority and concurring opinions used dicta to signal that Delaware law, which was previously thought to be settled,8 may
change for these types of post-closing breach-of-contract claims.9 Specifically, the court called into question whether a party to an acquisition
agreement could succeed on a breach-of-contract claim when the buyer
knows that a seller’s express representations or warranties are in breach
prior to closing.10 The claim in this situation, which is often predicated on
breach of an express warranty,11 was generally thought to be permissible
under Delaware law so long as there was not an anti-sandbagging provision or the buyer waived its claim.12 Contrary to this understanding of
Delaware law, the majority did not cite to the line of cases thought to be
the justification for this default rule.13 Instead, the court commented on
6. The standard RWI policy carves out coverage for claims where the buyer knows
about a breach prior to closing. See, e.g., Emily Maier, Guide to Representations and Warranty Insurance, WOODRUFF SAWYER 5 (Aug. 28, 2018), https://woodruffsawyer.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/WS_RepsWarranties_Insurance_Guide_9_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8GGM-DDW3] (discussing common clauses in RWI); Kirk Sanderson, What is Representations and Warranties Insurance?, LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR (2015), http://s3.amazonaws.com/
equityrisk.com/asset_files/86/original.pdf [https://perma.cc/5359-UMBD]. This position
taken by insurers is unsurprising as coverage of the sandbagging buyer leads to the moral
hazard where the buyer would not be incentivized to resolve the dispute before closing.
7. 187 A.3d 1209, 1236 n.185 (Del. 2018); id. at 1247 n.38 (Strine, J., concurring).
8. See, e.g., Soren Lindstrom, M&A Update: Maybe Delaware Is Not Pro-Sandbagging After All?, LINKEDIN (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ma-updatemaybe-delaware-pro-sandbagging-after-all-soren-lindstrom [https://perma.cc/S6QQMUJN] (discussing the “common belief among dealmakers . . . that Delaware is a ‘prosandbagging’ jurisdiction”); Glenn D. West, A Delaware Supreme Court Footnote Reignites
Concerns About the Reliability of Contractual Representations & Warranties–Are Deal
Lawyers Really Going to Start Debating Sandbagging Again?, GLOBAL PRIV. EQUITY
WATCH (Oct. 1, 2018), https://privateequity.weil.com/insights/delaware-supreme-courtfootnote/ [https://perma.cc/3L22-C5W3] (noting that, prior to the decision, most deal lawyers believed that Delaware would not require a reliance element).
9. Eagle Force, 187 A.3d at 1236 n.185; id. at 1247 (Strine, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 1236 n.185 (majority opinion).
11. The author recognizes that there is a common law distinction between the terms
“representation” and “warranty.” However, it is not uncommon for practitioners to refer
to them interchangeably or together throughout an acquisition agreement. See Tina L.
Stark, Nonbinding Opinion: Another View of Reps and Warranties, BUS. L. TODAY,
Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 8, 8–9 (2006) (discussing the common law distinction between a representation and a warranty and the difference in causes of action depending on which is
used). Nevertheless, this paper focuses primarily on breach-of-warranty claims, as buyers
will often bring the contract action under this theory.
12. See West, supra note 8; see also Sara Garcia Duran & Sacha Jamal, Possible Shift in
Delaware Law: Buyer’s Silence on Sandbagging Is Not Golden, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2018,
at 1, 1–2 (discussing the deal community’s general consensus that the Delaware default
position is pro-sandbagging).
13. Eagle Force, 187 A.3d at 1236 n.185.
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persuasive authority from New York that differs slightly from previous
perceptions of the Delaware default rule,14 which was followed by a bold
declaration that the law is “not yet resolved [on] this interesting question.”15 This footnote, paired with several sentences in the concurring
opinion,16 has led to speculation on how the court would rule in the future.17 Because Delaware is the choice of law used in a majority of M&A
deals, certainty in default rules is a necessity for its contractarian approach to corporate law.18 As such, this new uncertainty, if left unclarified by the Supreme Court of Delaware, could create higher transaction
costs for negotiating future M&A deals and distortions in deal prices—an
undesirable result for a state whose business has become corporate law.19
Thus, the primary aim of this paper will be two-fold: first, to summarize
the existing legal thought about contract claims in Delaware and cases
with these types of claims, and second, to recommend a rule for Delaware
courts to adopt. Within this recommendation, the paper will predict how
the court is likely to rule, as well as put forth a framework, through use of
a penalty default, in order to reach an optimal default rule. In Part II of
this paper, the background for the use of the term sandbagging and its
meaning in the M&A context is first laid out. Next, the paper will discuss
the conflicting historical roots of breach of warranty as well as the law
and economics movement and its effect on Delaware contract law generally. Then, the relevant Delaware precedent will be summarized, and the
two existing lines of Delaware precedent will be expounded upon. Finally, existing New York case law dealing with sandbagging will be
summarized.
In Part III, the paper will predict how the court would likely rule if the
issue was squarely before it. In addition, this section will also propose a
penalty default that most optimally creates an information-forcing effect
between the parties. Part IV provides recommendations for both buyers
and sellers, including model provisions, as well as other factors that
should be considered when negotiating provisions relating to a sandbagging claim. Part V summarizes and concludes the paper.
14. See infra Part II.C (discussing the nuances of New York’s default position).
15. Eagle Force, 187 A.2d at 1236 n.185.
16. See id. at 1247 (Strine, J., concurring).
17. See, e.g., West, supra note 8; Daniel E. Wolf, Sandbagging in Delaware, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 20, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard
.edu/2018/06/20/sandbagging-in-delaware/ [https://perma.cc/XGL5-U5XS].
18. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate
Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383, 384 (2007) (discussing how most of corporate law “is and
should be governed by default rules [as] a central tenet”).
19. While a default rule does not preclude parties under a Delaware agreement from
negotiating to the contrary, default rules have a large impact on the transaction costs of
both due diligence and negotiations depending on whether the default rule is pro-buyer,
pro-seller, or somewhere in between. See Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and
the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390–91 (1993) (discussing several of the theories posited for default rules and explaining their differences from immutable rules).
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II. BACKGROUND
The term “sandbagger” is commonly used in golf to denote a player
who pretends, usually through an inflated handicap, to be worse than
they are to take advantage of the opposition.20 This term, which did not
originate from golf,21 is used broadly in many situations, and MerriamWebster defines it as meaning “to conceal or misrepresent one’s true position, potential, or intent” or to “treat unfairly or harshly.”22 In the United
States M&A context, sandbagging is often used to describe a situation
where a buyer knows that a seller’s representations or warranties are in
breach prior to closing, but in spite of this breach, the buyer closes the
transaction and then pursues indemnification.23
Initially, this scenario may seem to fit Merriam-Webster’s definition of
being unfair or harsh, as the buyer knows it has an actionable claim based
on the breach and, as a result, may have a superior bargaining position to
renegotiate or close and then pursue damages. However, other commentators have pushed back on the use of the term “sandbagging” as they
posit that the risk has already been encompassed in the purchase price,
making it in no way unfair that the buyer found the breach prior to closing.24 As a result, there is a debate surrounding if the term “sandbagger”
is an apt description, and legal scholars and other commentators fall on
either side of the issue based on ethical,25 utilitarian,26 or plain fairness
grounds.27
The author recognizes that there is an ongoing trend in United States
M&A agreements for the damages in post-closing claims to be limited
through a sole remedies clause to an indemnification provision and be
20. See Dale Hartley, Games Master Manipulators Play: Sandbagging, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY (May 4, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/machiavellians-gullingthe-rubes/201705/games-master-manipulators-play-sandbagging [https://perma.cc/E43Y76U6] (further discussing the use of sandbagging in the context of trial advocacy and
poker).
21. The origination of the word “sandbagger” as a descriptive verb began at the turn
of the twentieth century “to describe the act of bludgeoning someone with a small, sandfilled bag . . . .” Sandbag, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/sandbagging [https://perma.cc/3PG9-QC4S] (last visited Sept. 14,
2019).
22. Id.
23. Glenn D. West & Kim M. Shah, Debunking the Myth of the Sandbagging Buyer:
When Sellers Ask Buyers to Agree to Anti-Sandbagging Clauses, Who is Sandbagging
Whom?, 11 M&A LAW. 3, 4 (2007).
24. See id. at 3 (positing that a buyer is reasonable to expect the benefit of the negotiated bargain they struck with the seller).
25. See JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES
FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 423 (1975) (discussing sandbagging as
“ethically questionable”); see also Stacey A. Shadden, How to Sandbag Your Opponent in
the Unsuspecting World of High Stakes Acquisitions, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 459, 474–75
(2014) (discussing the ethics of Canada and Europe’s anti-sandbagging approach and the
ethical considerations for a sandbagging buyer).
26. See Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1107 (advocating that a pro-sandbagging default
rule leads to parties being “less able to optimally allocate risk”).
27. See West & Shah, supra note 23, at 3 (postulating that the buyer may not be the
sandbagger because the seller is the one who made the express warranty to not misrepresent information).
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supplemented or supplanted by RWI.28 However, discussion of these topics is limited to only general trends,29 especially in light of recent prevailing market dynamics that have resulted in historically low indemnity
caps30 and the immaturity of the market for RWI generally.31 Furthermore, given that the typical buyer-side RWI policy contains a knowledge
carveout, RWI is likely to be inapplicable as part of the calculus for deciding a default rule based on risk shifting between the parties.32 In the remainder of Part II, this paper will discuss: (A) the origin of claims based
on breach of warranty under tort law, (B) the existing body of case law
for Delaware courts, and (C) the New York sandbagging default rule and
its nuanced interpretations.
A. BREACH-OF-WARRANTY CLAIMS
The following section will detail the historical development of breachof-warranty claims particularly as this is the primary type of claim
brought by a sandbagging buyer and affects the default rules set by
courts. The historical backdrop for a breach-of-warranty claim is one not
founded in the law of contract but instead in the law of tort.33 While
claims based solely in contract have existed for quite some time,34 breachof-warranty claims, until the early twentieth century, were largely
brought on tort principles.35 The use of the law of torts for a breach-of28. See, e.g., Market Trends: Indemnification Provisions in Asset Purchase Transactions, LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practiceadvisor/the-journal/b/lpa/posts/market-trends-indemnification-provisions-in-asset-pur
chase-transactions [Permalink unavailable] [hereinafter Market Trends] (the results of a
survey of 142 transactions from January 1, 2016, to September 6, 2016, showed that 60% of
deals limited claims exclusively to indemnity); see also James Moriarty & Major McCargo,
Deal Points Study, KRAMER LEVIN (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.kramerlevin.com/en/per
spectives-search/deal-points-study-representations-and-warranties-insurance-continues-itssignificant-influence-on-M&A-deal-terms.html [https://perma.cc/D9WC-KGZY] (detailing
the results of a survey of ninety-three middle-market private deals that revealed RWI was
used in 65% of deals, indemnity caps have been going down, and deals have “increasingly
seller-friendly terms”).
29. Undoubtedly, the use of sole remedy clauses and carved-out indemnity clauses
interplays with the risk-allocating functions of representations and warranties between parties. However, given the variability in deals and lack of publicly available information on
private deals, these topics will be limited to general trends for describing purchase and
merger agreements.
30. See 2019 M&A Outlook: It’s Still a Seller’s Market—For Now, BUS. WIRE (Jan. 29,
2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190129005187/en/ [https://per
ma.cc/25X4-E8QX] (results of a survey of over 600 U.S. companies showed a continued
appetite for M&A, continuing a years-long trend that is reinforcing the seller’s market).
31. See AIG, M&A INSURANCE—THE NEW NORMAL? 2 (2018), https://www.aig.com/
content/dam/aig/america-canada/us/documents/insights/aig-manda-claimsintelligence-2018r-and-w.pdf [https://perma.cc/D23J-F3T5] (discussing the maturation and evolution of the
RWI market and the rise in claims to almost one in every five transactions).
32. See sources cited supra note 6.
33. See J.B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888) (discussing
the earliest known warranty claim and how breach of warranty “in its origin [was] a pure
action of tort”).
34. Id.
35. See Samuel Williston, What Constitutes an Express Warranty in the Law of Sales, 21
HARV. L. REV. 555, 555–56 (1908).
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warranty claim, according to William Prosser, was historically “utilized to
avoid the consequences of contract law” such as the privity requirement.36 Thus, it is unsurprising that some characteristics of tort law may
still invade modern breach-of-warranty claims; however, in light of current contracting norms, revising breach of warranty, at least in the M&A
context, solely as a contract claim has been increasingly adopted by
courts.37 Neither Delaware’s legislature nor the Supreme Court of Delaware have ruled on this issue; however, the remainder of this subsection
details the paradigm generally adopted in Delaware and provides an effective lens through which to view the other Delaware case law and New
York authority on breach of warranty.38
1. The Law and Economics Movement and Its Impact on Contract
Claims
The law and economics (or contractarian)39 legal approach to Delaware corporate law and its effect on default contracting norms generally
provides, at least in this author’s opinion, a basis to help predict a new
breach-of-warranty default rule and supports selection of a penalty default rule. As a general proposition, law and economics builds on the theory of the corporation being no more than an extension of agency law
built on inter- and intra-contractual arrangements between agents, principals, and third parties.40 This view is generally considered to “dominate
the academic study of corporate law.”41 And much of the literature relates to how adoption of this view in legal structure leads to societally
efficient outcomes by providing dependable legal frameworks with contractual flexibility between parties.42 Such a view is important in this con36. Ainger v. Mich. Gen. Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1209, 1225 n.65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d,
632 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 95,
at 634–35 (4th ed. 1971)).
37. See Mathew J. Duchemin, Whether Reliance on the Warranty Is Required in a
Common Law Action for Breach of an Express Warranty?, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 689–91
(1999) (discussing the blurring of contract and tort law for breach-of-contract claims and
how a separation is the preferred outcome and trend).
38. See infra Part II.B–C.
39. The author notes that, from a pure theory perspective, advocates of the law and
economics practicum and supporters of the broader contractarian approach are not identical. However, for this work, and given the general interchangeability of the terms adopted
by practitioners and scholars, they will be used as synonyms. See David Millon, Default
Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job
Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 977–78, 977 n.10 (1998) (noting that “[w]hen thinking
about law and economics in the field of corporate law, one inevitably thinks about
contractarianism”).
40. See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (discussing generally the theoretical foundation for the
“nexus of contracts” or contractarian view of the firm).
41. Id. at 1399.
42. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 488 (1987) (discussing the balance of Delaware corporate law between the expectation that “Delaware’s law will remain relatively
stable” by not changing existing rules “for less desirable ones” and the reality that Delaware corporate law must “be flexible enough to respond rapidly to changing circumstances
in the marketplace”).
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text, as Delaware has been regarded as the most whole-hearted adopter
of this view, and its judges and legislature are sensitive to providing an
optimal corporate legal environment based in large part on this theory.43
Therefore, the law and economics theory, and the even broader “strong
contractarian bent,”44 adopted by Delaware is important in predicting a
workable default rule in the breach-of-contract context.45 This is not to
say that the theory has been wholly adopted by scholars46 but that even a
minimalist observer of the contractarian theory on Delaware’s bench
would be influenced by its prevalence in Delaware corporate law.47 Furthermore, even a penalty default rule would in some regard have to adhere to the general prevalence of contractarian gap filling in Delaware in
order to fit within the larger contracting norm. As a result, any default
rule adopted by the Delaware courts will likely be influenced by contractarianism, and understanding its relative importance will help predict
a default rule.
B. DELAWARE CASE LAW
Delaware is considered by many as allowing parties great latitude when
contracting and having that freedom judicially enforced.48 This general
adherence to contracts, or contractarian approach, has been attributed by
many to be a product of the state’s long history as the de facto incorporation state, with the state being preferred as a choice of venue to adjudicate commercial disputes in many transactions.49 This adherence to and
dependence on a contractarian approach to construing contracts is likely
an important factor for understanding how any court, even one in Delaware, could find that the contract alone is not dispositive. And since
sandbagging claims arise from express warranties or representations,
43. Furthermore, another reason for this adoption, and relevant to this work, is the
unique structure and politics of Delaware generally. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2537 (2005) (discussing Delaware’s law-making process and how
shareholders and managers dominate this process for the goal of promoting efficient corporate rules). And as one author has posited, “Delaware’s lawmaking structure makes contractarian results more likely . . . .” Id. This result may not be a surprise given the general
assumption for law and economics theory that Delaware corporate law, through its adoption of a contractarian approach, is efficient. See Macey & Miller, supra note 42, at 473.
44. See West, supra note 8 (discussing the general adoption of a contractarian approach to contract interpretation in Delaware).
45. See Roe, supra note 43, at 2536 (discussing how “Delaware corporate law comes
close to reflecting the contractarian agenda”).
46. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 758–60 (1995) (criticizing some of the underlying assumptions of the
contractarian theory of the firm and the law and economics movement’s theories on efficient corporate law).
47. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
48. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the general adoption of economic theory in the
conception of the firm and default contract terms); see also West, supra note 8 (discussing
Delaware’s adoption of its “stated contractarian principals”).
49. See Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance
and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1180 (2008) (discussing the
power and influence of the Delaware “brand” in corporate law and corporate disputes).
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which are treated like contract claims under the modern trend,50 an easy
answer to the question of how Delaware would decide a sandbagging default would be by the contract terms.51 However, this simple approach to
the issue is flawed because it does not consider the intermixing of tort and
contract principles that afflict Delaware’s pro-contract jurisprudence,52
and this approach is not determinative because many agreements are silent on the sandbagging issue. Therefore, in order to provide a basis for a
probative analysis, the remainder of this subsection will detail the diverging lines of cases under Delaware law and the recent Supreme Court of
Delaware case dealing with sandbagging.
1. Cases Supporting a Tort-Like Reliance Element
Prior to the court’s 2003 decision in Gloucester Holding Corp. v. U.S.
Tape & Sticky Products, LLC,53 Delaware had limited jurisprudence to
guide courts in cases involving a sandbagging buyer. However, even
within this limited body of case law, the general rule for a breach-of-warranty claim was that it included a reliance element.54 As one case declared, a common origin for a reliance element within a breach of
warranty comes from the case Loper v. Lingo.55 In Loper, the court set
the elements for a buyer to recover as: (1) “that at the time of the sale the
[goods were] warranted by the [seller] to be sound, and that the [buyer]
relied upon such warranty; (2) that there has been a breach of the warranty . . . ; and (3) that [the buyer] has sustained damages by reason of
said breach.”56 Spawning from this admittedly aged decision,57 several
Delaware decisions reaffirmed that reliance, in its traditional sense,58 is a
required element of a breach-of-warranty claim.59 Notably, while none of
50. See infra Part II.A.
51. See West, supra note 8 (discussing the general trend in Delaware to enforce agreements according to their terms).
52. See generally Glenn D. West & W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid ExtraContractual Liability—Can Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the “Entire” Deal?, 64
BUS. LAW. 999, 1001 (2009) (discussing the intermixing of tort and contract principles in
Delaware for the enforcement of negotiated acquisition agreements).
53. 832 A.2d 116 (Del. Ch. 2003).
54. See Loper v. Lingo, 97 A. 585, 586 (Del. Super. Ct. 1916).
55. Vigorone AG Prods., Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 649 (7th Cir. 2002)
(declaring Loper, 97 A. at 586, “the fons et origo of Delaware’s unorthodox position” on
buyer reliance in a breach-of-warranty claim).
56. Loper, 97 A. at 586 (emphasis added).
57. See Vigorone AG Prods., 316 F.3d at 649 (for a discussion from Judge Richard
Posner on the repetition of the use of Loper, 97 A. at 586, in Delaware as good law being
“unthinking” in light of the fact that breach of warranty was considered a tort instead of a
contract claim when Loper was decided); see also Aleksandra Miziolek & Dimitrios Angelakos, Contract Drafting: Sandbagging: From Poker to the World of Mergers and Acquisitions, 92 MICH. B.J. 30, 34 (2013) (explaining that “[t]he modern trend under state law is to
adopt a contract law approach” to breach of warranty claims).
58. Reference to a traditional or tort reliance that allows recovery of damages is generally considered to be composed of the following elements: (1) actual reliance by the
buyer and (2) the reliance was reasonable. See Jim Leitzel, Reliance and Contract Breach,
52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 90–91 (1989).
59. See Harvard Indus. Inc. v. Wendel, 178 A.2d 486, 496 (Del. Ch. 1962); Bleacher v.
Bristol-Myers Co., 163 A.2d 526, 527 (Del. Super. Ct. 1960); Kelly v. McKeeson HBOC,
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these cases have been explicitly overruled, only one case has held reliance
as an element for a breach-of-warranty claim after Gloucester was decided.60 In fact, all but a few of these cases were decided before the mass
acceptance of the law-and-economics theory in Delaware, and that alone
may cast doubt on their probative value as predictors of future Delaware
cases.61
2. Case Law Supporting a Modern Contractarian Approach
Since 2003, only one case has followed the Loper line of precedent,62
with Delaware courts instead favoring the approach adopted in Gloucester. In Gloucester, the buyer of substantially all of a seller’s assets counterclaimed both fraud and misrepresentation claims based on the seller’s
failure to disclose certain documents.63 In negotiating the transaction and
at closing, the seller, in several sections of the asset purchase agreement,
made representations that there were no omissions to the financial statements and that they were prepared in accordance with GAAP.64 The
buyer, given the “fast track” nature of the transaction (signed and closed
in one month), negotiated for and included an indemnification warrant by
the seller that would serve as the sole remedy for any breach of the representations or warranties.65 In the ensuing litigation, the seller argued on a
motion for failure to state a claim that the buyer had to plead a reliance
element in order to recover the indemnity on a breach-of-contract
claim.66 The court disposed of this assertion by stating that “[r]eliance is
not an element of [a] claim for indemnification” based on misrepresentations in the warranted evaluation materials.67 The court offered no citation to authority in disclaiming reliance as an element of the breach-ofcontract claim, and the judge specifically made no reference to prior Delaware breach-of-warranty cases.68
Inc., No. CIV.A. 99C–09–265WCC, 2002 WL 88939, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2002)
(denying summary judgment because the shareholders’ reliance on a warranty was an unresolved question of fact and a necessary element under “sound Delaware law”).
60. See MicroStrategy Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., No. 5735–VCP, 2010 WL
5550455, at *10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2010) (declaring that “[u]nder Delaware law, ‘a plaintiff
must establish reliance as a prerequisite for a breach of warranty claim’”) (quoting Kelly,
2002 WL 88939, at *8).
61. See supra Part I.
62. See MicroStrategy Inc., 2010 WL 5550455, at *10.
63. Gloucester Holding Corp. v. U.S. Tape & Sticky Products, LLC, 832 A.2d 116, 118
(Del. Ch. 2003) (the suit was brought by the seller after the buyer refused to pay the full
amount under the purchase agreement).
64. Id. at 121–22.
65. Id. at 122.
66. Id. at 127.
67. Id. at 127–28; see also Hudson’s Bay Co. Lux., S.A.R.L. v. JZ LLC, C.A. No.
10C–12–107–JRJ CCLD, 2011 WL 3082339, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 26, 2011) (“It is well
settled under Delaware law that the extent or quality of the buyer’s due diligence is not
relevant to the determination of whether the seller breached its representations and warranties in the agreement.”).
68. See Gloucester, 832 A.2d at 127–29.
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In another widely cited case, Interim Healthcare, Inc. v. Spherion Corp.,
an acquiror in a stock purchase, like in Gloucester, brought breach-ofcontract claims under the contract’s indemnity.69 The court cited to
Gloucester in reaffirming that reliance is not an element of a breach-ofwarranty claim.70 However, the court went further in its explanation by
boldly claiming that the buyer was “entitled to rely upon the accuracy of
the representation irregardless of what their due diligence may have or
should have revealed.”71 This case, paired with Gloucester, represents a
clear shift away from a reliance element in Delaware courts; however,
until 2007, a breach-of-warranty claim had not been decided in the
sandbagging context.
Finally, in Cobalt Operating, LLC v. James Crystal Enterprises, LLC,
Leo Strine, then a Vice Chancellor of the Court of Chancery, ruled explicitly that a purchaser need not show reliance on an allegedly breached
representation to recover damages.72 Of potential importance to the current state of the law, Chancellor Strine did not stop after ruling that reliance was not necessary but instead, in dicta, continued discussing the
“important risk allocation function” of express and unqualified representations.73 However, Chancellor Strine’s posture on this issue may be limited to the facts of Cobalt, since the seller intentionally hid information
that would have shown the falsehood of the representations even after
the buyer requested the information during due diligence.74
3. Eagle Force and Its Place Within Precedent
In the Supreme Court of Delaware’s recent case—Eagle Force—discussing the rights of a sandbagging buyer, neither the majority nor the
concurring opinions found the sandbagging claims central to the court’s
holding, yet both took occasion to discuss the current state of the law in
dicta.75 The underlying case involved a complex financing and formation
agreement between two businessmen where the parties were disputing
the contract formation of a contribution agreement.76 At particular issue,
and the issue relevant to a potential sandbagging claim, was a section of
the agreement that represented and warranted that Kay, the transferring
party, would confer all of the targeted companies’ securities at closing.77
69. Interim Healthcare, Inc. v. Spherion Corp., 884 A.2d 513, 517 (Del. Super. Ct.
2005).
70. Id. at 548.
71. Id.
72. Cobalt Operating, LLC v. James Crystal Enters., LLC, No. Civ.A. 714–VCS, 2007
WL 2142926, at *27 (Del. Ch. 2007), aff’d, 945 A.2d 594 (Del. 2008) (affirming without the
reliance issues for the express warranty being on appeal).
73. Id. at *28 (focusing particularly on the high cost of due diligence and how representations and warranties in the contract could “minimize a buyer’s need to verify every
minute aspect of a seller’s business”).
74. Id.
75. Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1236 n.185, 1247 n.38
(Del. 2018).
76. See id. at 1221–27.
77. Id. at 1234.

832

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

The provision detailing the contribution of all the securities, the key consideration for Kay’s side of the transaction, had blank schedules relating
to certain representations, except for an employee interest appreciation
plan, which was filled in but left in brackets.78 Because of the incomplete
schedule and the implication of the employee stock appreciation plan, the
trial court held it to be an incomplete material term, precluding the contract from being formed.79 The Supreme Court of Delaware interpreted
this provision differently and subsequently reversed the Court of Chancery. The court held that, regardless of the fact that both parties knew the
transferring party did not own all the stock, the transferring party, nevertheless, represented that it could by closing through its signature of the
document, thereby forming an enforceable agreement.80
After deciding to overrule the trial court, the court proceeded in a footnote to comment on the ramifications of the decision of finding contract
formation, namely by musing about whether the buyer would be precluded from a breach-of-warranty claim.81 In the appeal, the transferor
argued that reliance was a requirement, but the court, in what can only be
described as dicta, declared the issue unresolved but an “interesting question.”82 The court did not cite to either line of precedent discussed above,
instead favoring a citation to an earlier Supreme Court of Delaware decision that, like Eagle Force, did not reach the breach-of-warranty claim.83
Stopping here would have been enough to cause uncertainty in the deal
community, but the court continued by citing an influential New York
Court of Appeals case, acknowledging that a majority of states had followed this New York Court of Appeals decision, which does not require
“traditional reliance.”84
In a concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part opinion (hereinafter the
concurring opinion), Chancellor Strine, while discussing the definiteness
of the agreement, also doubted the ability of the contributing party to sue
the transferring party.85 In particular, Chancellor Strine expressed “doubt
78. Id. at 1234–35.
79. Id. The trial court reasoned that, because an employee compensation plan existed
on the schedules, the transferring party could not in fact own all of the interest in the
limited liability corporation as represented. See Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell,
No. 10803–VCMR, 2017 WL 3833210, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2017). As a result, the party
making the representation could never have transferred all interest as required by the
agreement, and the other party knew this. Id. at *9–11, 16.
80. See Eagle Force, 187 A.3d at 1235. Such an interpretation supports the broad proposition that Delaware courts adopt the contractarian view of contracts and enforce these
agreements by their terms even when it results in harsh outcomes.
81. See id. at 1236 n.185.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Genencor Int’l, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 766 A.2d 8, 12 n.8 (Del. 2000)
(failing to reach the issue on appeal but, nevertheless, discussing the case law cited by the
opposition brief relating to well-established New York cases)).
84. Id. (citing CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ’g Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1001 (N.Y. 1990)
(stating that this view of reliance reflected the “prevailing perception of an action for
breach of express warranty as one that is no longer grounded in tort, but essentially in
contract”)).
85. Id. at 1247 (Strine, C., concurring).
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that [Kay could] then turn around and sue because what [Kay] knew to
be false remained so.”86 While not expressly laying out his reasons, Chancellor Strine made reference to “[v]enerable Delaware law” as casting
doubt on Kay’s ability to recover on a breach-of-representation theory.87
Strikingly, this seems at odds with his previous opinions on the Court of
Chancery, but once again, the unique factual scenario may be a distinguishing factor.88
While both the majority and the concurring opinions seem to indicate
that the buyer’s claim for breach of warranty may not be tenable under
Delaware law, neither cited to existing Delaware cases ruling on the issue.89 Nevertheless, both opinions did provide insight, through reference
to other cases, on how the court might rule on the issue in the future.90
Therefore, a prediction of the court’s future position necessitates further
discussion of relevant New York law, given the majority’s citation to New
York’s seminal case.91
C. NEW YORK CASE LAW
1. CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.: The Preeminent ProSandbagging Case
In an often cited and influential case, CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing
Co., the New York Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court, seemingly clarified whether breach of warranty was a contract or tort claim—
in favor of the former.92 Building on prior cases,93 the court did not find
that traditional reliance was required in order to pursue a breach-of-war86. Id. (citing the majority opinion’s discussion of the Court of Chancery’s findings
that the transferor could not provide the requisite consideration as he did not own all the
interest).
87. Id. In support of this position, the concurring opinion referenced only one case,
Clough v. Cook, 87 A. 1017, 1019–20 (Del. Ch. 1913), which holds that a party cannot bring
a claim on a false representation when the party knows the representation is false when the
contract was signed. See id. at 1018–19 (discussing the “general rule that a misrepresentation must be relied upon by the party receiving it”) (internal citations omitted).
88. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
89. The omission by Chancellor Strine to cite Cobalt was interesting in light of its
general acceptance by practitioners as the strongest case for a pro-sandbagging default rule
position. See Adrian Szycowski, Devils in the Details: An Essay Examining the Significance
of Jurisdictional Default Rules in the Mergers and Acquisitions Context, 4 EMORY CORP.
GOV. & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 441, 445 (2017) (discussing Cobalt as solidifying Delaware’s pro-sandbagging default). Furthermore, the pointed omission to cite to other Delaware cases dealing with express breach of warranty, even in the UCC context, is
particularly concerning as it gives little, if any, guidance for how to approach breach-ofwarranty claims generally.
90. See Eagle Force, 187 A.3d at 1236–37, 1247–49.
91. See id. at 1236 n.185 (citing CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ’g Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1001
(N.Y. 1990)).
92. Ziff-Davis, 553 N.E.2d at 1000–01. While not the first case in New York refusing to
require a reliance element, this case is generally considered the root of current New York
breach-of-warranty (and through implication, sandbagging) jurisprudence.
93. See, e.g., Ainger v. Mich. Gen. Corp., 476 F.Supp. 1209, 1224–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
aff’d, 632 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1980) (ruling that the elements for a breach-of-warranty claim
did not include a reliance element); Overstreet v. Norden Labs., 669 F.2d 1286, 1291 (6th
Cir. 1982); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1965).
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ranty claim.94 Instead, the court held that a buyer need only rely on the
belief that it was purchasing an express warranty for the seller’s promise
that the information was true.95
In the underlying transaction, CBS purchased from Ziff-Davis Publishing certain media businesses after having reviewed financial statements
describing the state of the businesses.96 In the purchase agreement, the
seller warranted that the accuracy of these and future financial statements
and the seller warranted that there would be no materially adverse
change in the media businesses until closing.97 After reviewing the previously disclosed financial statements and new unaudited statements, CBS
not only doubted the accuracy of the profitability figures but also notified
Ziff-Davis about their doubts.98 Nevertheless, upon notice of these
doubts, Ziff-Davis continued to warrant the financial statements, threatening “to pursue all of its rights and remedies as provided by law” if CBS
did not close.99 Following this threat, the buyer closed the transaction but
only upon the express condition that closing did “not constitute a
waiver.”100
After closing, the buyer then sued the seller for breach of an express
warranty based on the allegedly defective financial statements.101 In its
defense, Ziff-Davis claimed that, given CBS’s disbelief in the warranty
prior to closing, CBS could not claim to rely on the warranty—effectively
precluding recovery because of this lack of reliance.102 The court rejected
this argument in favor of CBS’s claim that reliance on the truth of the
representation and warranty at closing was not necessary.103 Instead, the
court required only that the buyer “rel[y] on the express warranty as being a part of the bargain between the parties.”104 Given the express reservation of CBS prior to closing, the court found this sufficient to carry the
burden that it relied on the warranty when striking the bargain.105
94. Ziff-Davis, 75 N.Y.2d at 1000–01. Ziff-Davis’s arguments for a reliance element
were similar to what are common to fraud and misrepresentation claims, i.e., “a belief in
the truth of the representations made in the express warranty and a change of position in
reliance on that belief.” Id. at 1000.
95. Id. at 1000–01.
96. Id. at 998.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court stated that “it must be emphasized” that CBS learned of the falsity of
the statements after signing but before closing. Id. at 1000. The court’s emphasis here may
signal that the holding is only limited to claims when the buyer learns of a warranty’s falsity
after signing.
99. Id. at 999.
100. Id. The purchase agreement also contained an express provision that CBS would
be allowed to rely on its own accountant’s representations of the validity of the financial
disclosures made by Ziff-Davis. Id. at 1003 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 999 (majority opinion). The buyer was able to bring the claim post-closing
based on a survival clause which allowed the accuracy of the representations and warranties to “survive the closing, notwithstanding any investigation” by CBS. Id.
102. Id. at 999–1000.
103. Id. at 1000–01.
104. Id. at 1001.
105. Id.
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As a result of this decision, courts must now go into the additional fact
inquiry of whether the buyer actually negotiated for the warranty and
relied on it. Such a rule is not altogether different from a strict breach-ofcontract claim, but it, nevertheless, does create a nuanced, though limited, reliance element.106 And while deriving the New York default rule
seems fairly straightforward, some scholars have noted the uniquely
buyer-friendly facts of Ziff-Davis create some latent ambiguities in the
application of the rule in similar cases.107
2. Ziff-Davis’s Progeny
While the New York Court of Appeals has yet to rule on another case
involving a sandbagging provision, three federal court cases, all applying
New York law, may have further explained the New York default rule
from Ziff-Davis.108 In Galli v. Metz, a transaction to sell a petroleum business was signed and closed on the same day with payment via a promissory note.109 After one month, the buyer attempted to reduce the note’s
payment on several theories.110 The buyer’s main argument was based on
two breach-of-warranty claims involving a major tax levy and lawsuit with
a customer, respectively.111 The court denied the buyer relief, reasoning
that the buyer had waived its right to the express warranty in the closing
documents.112 To rectify this result with its mandatory precedent—ZiffDavis—the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished the case on its facts and expanded Ziff-Davis to preclude “a
buyer . . . [who] in full knowledge and acceptance of facts disclosed by the
seller” signs and closes the transaction anyway.113
After Galli, the Second Circuit was again presented with a similar
breach-of-warranty claim where the buyer of a painting signed the bill of
sale based on assurances in the agreement that the seller had no adverse
information regarding the painting’s authenticity.114 The court, applying
106. See id.
107. See Robert Quaintance, Jr., Can You Sandbag? When a Buyer Knows Seller’s Reps
and Warranties Are Untrue, 5 M&A LAW. 8 (2002) (discussing a limited reading of the
court’s holding in Ziff-Davis considering the facts of the case and how the opinion is
structured).
108. See, e.g., Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1997); Galli v. Metz,
973 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1992); Coastal Power Int’l, Ltd. v. Transcon. Capital Corp., 10 F.
Supp. 2d 345, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
109. Galli, 973 F.2d at 147.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 149–51 (reasoning that such a waiver was based on the simultaneous
signing and closing of the agreement, indicating that the buyer did not rely on the warrants
because there was no diligence to check their accuracy).
113. Id. at 151 (distilling the rule to require the buyer to “expressly preserve[ ] his rights
under the warranties”); cf. CBS, Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1000–01
(N.Y. 1990) (finding the buyer had already signed the purchase agreement when it found
that the warranty was untrue but had expressly reserved its rights at closing).
114. Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that, while this
case fell under the UCC as a sale of goods transaction, the Ziff-Davis line of precedent,
nevertheless, applied for the express warranty in the bill of sale).
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both Ziff-Davis and Galli, reasoned that the buyer could still prevail on
the breach-of-warranty claim even if the buyer knew, through a third
party or “common knowledge,” that the seller’s claim is false, but only so
long as the buyer “expressly preserves [its] rights.”115 In essence, Rogath
clarified an ambiguity in Galli by stating that knowledge of the warranty’s
falsity is relevant, but only if the source is the seller.116 As a result of
these cases, the law is nuanced and somewhat unclear. But at the very
least, it is fair to reason that the law will preserve any buyer’s sandbagging claim, so long as it expressly reserves the right to rely on a warranty,
representation, or covenant.117
3. The Synthesized New York Rule
Applying Ziff-Davis and the clarifying federal cases, the New York default rule could be read as:
In the absence of a pro-sandbagging clause in the agreement, a purchaser who prior to signing knows of a breach of a representation,
warranty, or covenant contained in the agreement will be precluded
from seeking post-closing damages or indemnification if the purchaser is aware of such breach as a result of the seller’s disclosure.118
However, if the clarifying federal cases after Ziff-Davis are not taken into
account by Delaware, then the New York rule would read: “In the absence of a clause or language to the contrary, a purchaser need only show
that it relied on the information being represented or warranted as true
and that it had a contractual right to seek damages for the information
being untrue under a breach of contract claim.”119 As both proposed
readings show, the New York rule does not contain a true reliance element. Instead, New York law requires a party asserting breach to prove
that the warranty was a right that the buyer thought it was buying as part
of the transaction. Simply stated, the buyer must believe that it is
purchasing a right to a claim and that the warranty purely is “insurance
against any future claims.”120 While neither of the above interpretations
115. Id.
116. See id.; see also Brandon Cole, Knowledge Is Not Necessarily Power: Sandbagging
in New York M&A Transactions, 42 J. CORP. L. 445, 450 (2016) (discussing the nuanced
rule from the Galli case); Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171,
186 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he general rule is that a buyer may enforce an express warranty
even if it had reason to know that the warranted facts were untrue.”); Coastal Power Int’l,
Ltd. v. Transcon. Capital Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 345, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“The buyer’s
awareness of [the warranty’s falseness] from other sources, however, creates no such
difficulty.”).
117. See Cole, supra note 116, at 455–56.
118. See Joe Brennan, “Sandbagging” and “Knowledge” Clauses in M&A Agreements,
NERLAND LINDSEY (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.snclaw.com/cgblog/48/123/Sandbaggingand-Knowledge-Clauses-in-M-A-Agreements [https://perma.cc/Y4UP-PNZY] (presenting
a consolidation of the default rule in New York).
119. See CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ’g Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1000–01 (N.Y. 1990) (construing reliance as “requiring no more than reliance on the express warranty as being a
part of the bargain”).
120. Rogath, 129 F.3d at 265.
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of the rule are fully contractarian given the presence of a tort-like element of reliance, this slight detour from a pure contract claim may nonetheless be considered and adopted by Delaware,121 especially in light of
the citation to New York authority in the Eagle Force case.122
III. ANALYSIS
In the following section, this paper will first propose a penalty default
rule that best solves the asymmetrical information problems of M&A
transactions, which typically is the key issue in sandbagging claims. The
next portion will analyze the various precedents in Delaware and New
York to predict how the Supreme Court of Delaware would rule on the
issue. Throughout both analyses, a fundamental underpinning will consist
of the broader contractarian approach that the courts and contracting
parties generally take in these agreements.
A. JUSTIFICATION FOR A PRO-SANDBAGGING RULE:
PENALTY DEFAULTS
An efficient default sandbagging position can be analyzed by way of
proposing a “penalty default” rule on one party to promote more efficient contracting in the overall transaction.123 A penalty default has been
applied in other contexts,124 but a penalty default has only been proposed
in this context as additional support for an anti-sandbagging position.125
In other contexts, the theoretical justification for selecting penalty defaults to promote efficient markets has been criticized based primarily on
differences in party sophistication;126 however, unlike those contexts, in
121. When interpreting New York law, Chancellor Strine discussed the differences in
the public policy reasons for allowing a buyer who finds a representation to be false after
signing but before closing to sue post-closing and the case of allowing a buyer to just walk
the deal in lieu of closing. In re IBP, Inc. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 82 n.200 (Del. Ch.
2001).
122. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
123. The term “penalty default” was coined by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner to propose a new method for courts to fill in contracts that left certain terms silent. Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
124. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and
Demand for Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1400–01 (2008) (applying information-forcing rules in the environmental context); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a
Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1188 (2008) (proposing the use of informationforcing rules for disclosure of use of genetic material); Alex Reinart, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (2012) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks
of information forcing through a penalty default pleading standard).
125. Charles Whitehead first proposed the penalty default rule in the sandbagging context in order to advocate for an anti-sandbagging default rule nationally. See Whitehead,
supra note 4, at 1100–07. While this effort was laudable and based on compiled empirical
data from various deals, the efficacy of the penalty default to produce the desired antisandbagging result does not reflect current market trends and, particularly, Delaware’s
unique approach to contracts. See id. at 1093–100 (detailing the results of a compilation of
various deals between 2007–2010).
126. A common criticism of this approach is that, even when default rules are information forcing, parties do not change their contract negotiation position for other reasons.
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M&A negotiations, both parties are likely to be relatively sophisticated.127 Thus, the analysis of different penalty defaults in this context
would theoretically be sound in order to reach an efficient and definite
default rule—a goal central to Delaware’s corporate law prominence.128
Generally, the use of a penalty default is for the primary objective of
reaching more efficient societal outcomes, namely lower transaction costs
and more efficient price finding.129 While parties would presumably already advocate on their own behalf for better outcomes, scholars have
noted the information asymmetries that exist between parties and how it
leads to parties foregoing more efficient negotiations.130 Because of these
asymmetries and the effect on splitting the contractual pie, some parties
will “prefer to have inefficient precaution rather than pay a higher price”
if all information was disclosed.131 This election to choose inefficient outcomes on a deal-by-deal basis is not efficient at the system level but may
be remedied by selecting default rules that force parties to share information.132 Accordingly, lawmakers and courts should select default rules
that induce knowledgeable parties to disclose in a manner that leads to
better price discovery and lower costs.133
M&A transactions are no stranger to information asymmetry between
parties as the complexity of corporate structures and the costs of due diliSee, e.g., J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 899, 906 (2015) (criticizing information-forcing rules in the context of form contracts because of consumer indifference to disclosures from the sophisticated party about
the penalty default).
127. See Ari Dropkin, Skin in the Game: The Promise of Contingency-Based M&A
Fees, 103 GEO. L.J. 1061, 1063 (2015) (describing transactional lawyers as “crucial” to
M&A deals).
128. See John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1347 (2012)
(discussing the “value-added” effect of using Delaware corporate law to govern choice-oflaw provisions in transactions and when incorporating); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1773
(2006) (discussing how a legislative response to new or novel issues is delayed “until the
Delaware courts decide at least one case squarely”).
129. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 123, at 91. The use of penalty defaults generally fits
within the larger vein of law and economics literature, which makes it a relevant and
adoptable analysis for Delaware. See infra Part I (discussing the adoption of contractarian
approaches to contracts by both practitioners and the courts).
130. See Verkerke, supra note 126, at 906. In a Coasean world where transaction costs
would allow full negotiation of all terms, parties would not have to pick and choose which
issues to negotiate; however, the realities of high transaction costs make it necessary to
create default rules to promote more efficient contracting. See Whitehead, supra note 4, at
1090 n.3 (discussing the Coasean theory and subsequent modifications by other scholars
which take into account the costs of contracting).
131. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 123, at 94; cf. Paul B. Stephan, Bond v. United States
and Information-Forcing Defaults: The Work that Presumptions Do, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1465, 1477 (2015) (discussing the efficient decision making of parties without taking
into account precaution inefficiencies).
132. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 123, at 94–97.
133. See Mathew D. Cain et al., Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in Private
Equity Contracting and Strategic Default, 40 J. CORP. L. 565, 575–76 (2015) (discussing how
either a wary buyer or wary seller will move the purchase price to account for skepticism of
the other party’s disclosures).
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gence can lead to parties either strategically withholding information134
or relying on ex post litigation to remedy disclosure issues through use of
an indemnity or RWI.135 In fact, it is common practice for a Delaware
M&A transaction to be silent on the issue of sandbagging, and parties
instead risk adjusting through the indemnity clause or scope of representations.136 Therefore, while the use of a penalty default could serve as an
effective mechanism to promote better practices through promoting disclosure, it must be tailored to the concerns of sandbagging claims and the
effects such rules would have on the parties in terms of other costs.137
1. An Unqualified Pro-Sandbagging Rule
In applying the penalty default, the primary goal would be stimulating
information-forcing behavior between parties. Under a pro-sandbagging
default rule, the penalty imposed would fall to the seller, as it would be
liable for post-closing indemnity claims that could only be mitigated
through disclosure.138 Since the majority of the penalty would fall to the
seller, a seller who wants to avoid a sandbagging buyer would be charged
with either: (1) negotiating around the default rule or (2) minimizing the
chance of a sandbagging claim. Under either option, more disclosure is
likely to occur, notwithstanding the various other costs such a default
would impose.
Under the first option, there are several hurdles the seller would face
when negotiating for an anti-sandbagging clause.139 First, the current
deal-making market has a low incidence rate of anti-sandbagging provisions even though the previous consensus was a pure pro-sandbagging
rule.140 This fact alone may lead to the inference that buyers discount
134. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 123, at 94; see also Stephan, supra note 131, at
1476–78 (discussing how one party often has more information but will only disclose information when doing so will increase the joint surplus, or value created, by contracting with
the other party).
135. See Jeffrey Chapman et al., Representations and Warranties Insurance in M&A
Transactions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/11/representations-and-warranties-insurance-inma-transactions/ [https://perma.cc/T57T-8VL3] (discussing the rise in representation and
warranty insurance as a risk-adjusting mechanism in M&A deals for both buyers and
sellers).
136. See ABA, DEAL POINTS STUDY: PRIVATE TARGET MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 60
(2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/committees/ma/deal_points/
[Permalink unavailable] (reviewing 139 deals from 2016 to 2017 for sandbagging provisions
and finding that 51% were silent on the issue).
137. See Dropkin, supra note 127, at 1073–74 (discussing how “contractual arrangement
is typically dictated by transaction costs flowing from controllable risk and the allocation of
uncontrollable risk”).
138. Cf. Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1088–89 (postulating that a seller in a pro-sandbagging jurisdiction, fearing a buyer bringing a claim, will “reflect the risk of sandbagging in all
contracts,” which would lead to all buyers sharing at least some of the costs).
139. See id. at 1101 (noting that practitioners claim that these types of negotiations “are
often lengthy, emotional, and heated”).
140. See What’s Market Analytics: Sandbagging Provisions (2017), PRAC. L. CORP. &
SEC. (Dec. 27, 2017), https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-012-3972 [Permalink
unavailable] [hereinafter What’s Market Analytics] (only 3% of the surveyed deals contained anti-sandbagging provisions). Furthermore, this trend directly contradicts the as-
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acquisitions that contain this clause.141 On the other hand, a rational
seller that values an anti-sandbagging right would be able to reassure the
buyer through either more disclosure or more expansive warranties.142 In
this way, hurdles to negotiating an anti-sandbagging right promote information forcing between parties. But this view of sellers, as previously
mentioned, may be optimistic because parties do not always negotiate
rationally,143 and if more disclosure or warranties alone were enough to
negotiate for anti-sandbagging clauses, there would arguably be a higher
incidence rate for these clauses.144
Under the second option, sellers would have multiple actions available
to reduce the chance that a sandbagging claim might be brought. The
easiest method would be to conduct due diligence on all represented material in order to ensure that no misleading or inaccurate information exists.145 However, this method would be inefficient in the vast majority of
deals, as this amount of due diligence would incur substantial transaction
costs on the part of the seller.146 Another action the seller could take
would be disclosing potential inaccuracies up front. Adopting such an approach runs the risk that the buyer could sour on the deal or ask for a
reduced price since risks would be known.147 But on the other hand, this
increased disclosure would give buyers greater opportunity to model and
understand their risks, validating the penalty default’s central premise of
information forcing to reach efficient outcomes. Accordingly, both options to the seller would likely promote increased disclosure, but this penalty default must still be weighed against an anti-sandbagging penalty
default.
sumption that a seller’s market would change the dynamics and increase the incidence rate
of anti-sandbagging provisions. Cf. Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1094 (showing an incidence
rate of 3.2% for anti-sandbagging provisions).
141. See Cain et al., supra note 133, at 575–76.
142. See Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1104 (discussing how a seller may be able to communicate information at a lower cost through the use of warranties, as opposed to just
disclosing the information).
143. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
144. This inference is hard to arrive at by empirical evidence alone as the majority of
Delaware agreements are silent on the issue, producing a confounding variable to testing.
See Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1089 (discussing the odd phenomenon of pro-sandbagging
or silence being common with anti-sandbagging clauses consistently over time regardless of
governing law).
145. To be sure, this is the solution a Coasean type theory of contracting would reach,
as the seller would be able to warrant and represent with its best confidence the fully
vetted material. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
146. Unlike the Coasean world, high transaction costs associated with lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants exist in a deal and can create cost-prohibitive barriers.
However, this is not to say sellers will not, or should not, engage in diligence, as the norm is
to fully investigate the assets being sold. See Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1104 (discussing
how most sellers will “double-check” at least the accuracy of their warranties).
147. On the other hand, such disclosure could increase the pool of potential bidders,
and drive up the price, as the inherent risk of inaccuracies would decrease, causing more
buyers to consider the sale. See Cain et al., supra note 133, at 574–77 (discussing the role of
reputation and disclosure in reducing buyer discounts on assets sold).
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2. Anti-Sandbagging
Applying this model to an anti-sandbagging default could potentially
be more beneficial than a pure pro-sandbagging default rule.148 Under
such a penalty default, the buyer would face a default rule of silence being equivalent to an anti-sandbagging provision, and such a buyer, upon
learning of any inaccuracy prior to closing, would need to disclose this
fact to the seller and renegotiate or give up the contractual right postclosing.149 This leaves the buyer with two means to counteract the default: (1) negotiate around the default rule or (2) request more documents and conduct more pre-signing diligence to avoid sandbagging
altogether.
Turning to the first option available to a buyer, the buyer could renegotiate for a sandbagging right outright. In return, the seller would be able
to negotiate a premium or other favorable term, such as a narrower warranty, by selling a pro-sandbagging provision to the buyer.150 However,
this does little for changing the information flow between the parties and
could even lead to less sharing.151 Furthermore, once the buyer attains
the sandbagging right, it would then face a seller attempting to mitigate,
through disclosure, any sandbagging claim, as illustrated in the example
above. But with the costs already sunk by both parties to negotiate
around the anti-sandbagging default, this would provide no additional
benefit over a pro-sandbagging default.152 A second option would be for
the buyer to negotiate a relaxation or limitation on the knowledge requirement.153 But even this limitation on knowledge would never be extended past actual knowledge, leaving the buyer with the evidentiary
burden of disproving knowledge on every claim.154 And this lower
148. This conclusion was put forward by Charles Whitehead when analyzing a large
sample size of deals. Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1106. The article asserts that when “the
net benefits of disclosure are positive, a penalty default may be more valuable.” Id. at 1105.
However, in concluding that anti-sandbagging accrues net benefits to disclosure, the article
failed to rebut the argument made by some, West & Shah, supra note 23, at 4, that sellers
are disincentivized to disclose evidence of breach or will instead dump the data at the last
minute. Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1106–07.
149. It is worth noting that while the buyer would be precluded from bringing a breachof-warranty claim, it could still bring an action based on misrepresentation or fraud on the
part of the buyer, but such a claim would run into issues for the buyer to meet the traditional reliance elements.
150. See Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1105–07 (discussing the sale of a sandbagging right
to a willing buyer).
151. See Daniel Avery et al., Trends in M&A Provisions: “Sandbagging” and “AntiSandbagging” Provisions, BLOOMBERG L. REP. (2018), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
product/BLPG/document/XBBHJ1TS000000?documentName=ORCA96399.pdf&fmt=pdf
[Permalink unavailable] (arguing that an anti-sandbagging clause would lead to less diligence on both sides).
152. Cf. Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1106 (finding that an anti-sandbagging default
would be more optimal than a pro-sandbagging default rule, as sellers would be able to
differentiate potential buyers interested in a sandbagging right and silence on the issue
would allow the buyer to negotiate favorable terms).
153. Shadden, supra note 25, at 465–66.
154. See id.; see also Cole, supra note 116, at 453 (discussing the risk a sandbagging
buyer takes given the unpredictability of the court system in these fact-intensive cases).
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amount of due diligence may lead to higher discounts due to buyers being
less sure of what they are buying.155 Therefore, a buyer faces attenuated
circumstances where the costs of negotiating for a sandbagging right
would be less than the benefit, thereby nullifying the benefits of a penalty
default.156
Alternatively, the buyer could push for more disclosure pre-signing as a
means to narrow the terms it negotiates for those representations and
warranties that seem accurate.157 While seemingly not inefficient because
the buyer is likely to complete the diligence at some point, markets are
competitive, and there could be several buyers vying for the same set of
assets. This would create multiple, larger due diligence projects, all prior
to signing. Furthermore, when an anti-sandbagging clause is the default,
sellers may have less incentive to share data up front and, instead, favor
disclosure after signing, which would allow them to argue constructive or
actual notice on the part of the buyer.158 Conversely, buyers may be more
reluctant to request information from the seller, fearing either an actualor constructive-knowledge theory with an anti-sandbagging clause in the
agreement.159 As a result of these arguments, an anti-sandbagging default
rule likely is not an efficient mechanism to promote information sharing
between the parties. Thus, under the penalty default rule analysis, the
pro-sandbagging default rule best serves the purpose of promoting information sharing between parties in order to reduce transaction costs and
increase price discovery.
B. PRECEDENT PREDICTS

A

RULE SIMILAR

TO

NEW YORK LAW

Notwithstanding the beneficial default position discussed above, given
Delaware’s lower court precedent, New York precedent, and Chancellor
Strine’s previous opinions, the Delaware Supreme Court is likely to create a rule very similar, if not identical, to that of New York. A difficulty in
predicting the adoption of Ziff-Davis, however, is predicting how the
court will interpret Ziff-Davis in light of the subsequent New York federal cases. Therefore, the following subsection will first predict and explain why the court is likely to adopt the New York rule. It will then
predict the other boundaries of such a default rule in light of subsequent
federal cases applying the New York rule.
155. This is the classic lemons problem: the buyer, not knowing which goods are lemons, will discount all of the goods to reallocate the cost of one lemon.
156. See generally Cole, supra note 116, at 454–55 (discussing the various hurdles a
buyer faces when pursing a claim under an anti-sandbagging default or clause).
157. In doing so, the buyer would presumably be able to arrive at a more efficient
purchase price by knowing its risks and only seeking representations and warranties on
riskier projections or statements. See generally Lietzel, supra note 58, at 99–100 (discussing
scenarios in which the buyer will negotiate for additional reliance expectation, but only
when the benefits of contract completion outweigh the costs).
158. Id.
159. See Cole, supra note 116, at 451 (noting how constructive-knowledge standards
“magnif[y]” the issues when an anti-sandbagging clause exists).
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1. The Delaware Courts are Likely to Follow the New York Approach
In the recent Supreme Court of Delaware decision, the only Delaware
case cited by the majority opinion is seemingly misplaced when referring
to this type of breach-of-warranty claim, leaving a reader unclear as to
which line of Delaware precedent will be followed.160 In the Delaware
case that was cited, the buyer was attempting to use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent the seller from nullifying a breach-of-warranty
claim through a detrimental reliance defense.161 The court never reached
this argument, or the underlying issue of whether reliance was an element
at all, and ruled on other grounds.162 Therefore, this case provides little
probative value for how the court might rule.163
Notwithstanding the lack of a citation to other Delaware law in Eagle
Force, previous cases, particularly post-Gloucester cases, should not be
discounted for their influence over how the court would rule.164 The underlying ruling in the Eagle Force case was that a contract could be
formed in spite of the fact that a term, which was the key consideration
for one side, could never be fulfilled.165 This strict construction of the risk
allocation, in spite of the major term being objectively inaccurate, reinforces the prevailing view that Delaware courts are contractarian. And
this contractarian view of risk allocation parallels much of the foundational reasoning for many of the post-Gloucester cases.166 As a result, Eagle Force is indicative that some form of the approach to breach of
warranty and representation taken in the post-Gloucester cases will be
adopted. If adopted, this would effectively make the default rule prosandbagging. This is because a seller’s arguments of waiver and detrimental reliance would likely have no effect on the express contractual nature
of the representations and warranties, since breach of warranty or repre-

160. See Genencor Int’l, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 766 A.2d 8, 12 n.8 (Del. 2000).
161. Id. at 11. The Supreme Court of Delaware read the lower court’s ruling differently
than both parties and found that the omission of a patent in the contract constituted a part
of the bargained-for exchange. Id. Therefore, the reliance element did not need to be in
dispute as a means to incorporate the missing patent as part of the transaction. Id. at 12.
162. Id.
163. By disposing of the breach-of-warranty issue on other grounds, it was unnecessary
to discuss the buyer’s assertion that breach-of-warranty claims have no reliance element.
Id. However, the court, in an unnecessary footnote, cited the buyer position, which was
supported by the Ziff-Davis case, but ultimately claimed that it “d[id] not need to address
this argument.” Id. at 12 n.8.
164. See supra Part II.
165. Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1236–37 (Del. 2018).
166. See Cobalt Operating, LLC v. James Crystal Enters., LLC, No. Civ.A. 714–VCS,
2007 WL 2142926, at *28 (Del. Ch. 2007), aff’d, 945 A.2d 594 (Del. 2008) (reasoning that
contractual representations “serve an important risk allocation function” and require no
justified reliance); Interim Healthcare, Inc. v. Spherion Corp., 884 A.2d 513, 548 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that reasonable reliance is not required for a breach-of-warranty
claim and the buyer can rely on the representations “irregardless of what their due diligence may have or should have revealed”).
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sentation under the post-Gloucester cases sheds the tort-like element of
reliance.167
Further bolstering this prediction of a pro-sandbagging default rule are
the various cases, including Eagle Force, that Chancellor Strine has written in the past.168 Beginning with his concurring opinion in Eagle Force,
which was joined by Justice Vaughn, there was no citation to Delaware
case law except for an obscure 100-year-old case.169 Seemingly, this citation stands for the proposition that when a party signs a contract with a
representation that it knows is false, they cannot later sue based on reliance on the representation.170 This language seems to echo that which
encompasses the New York rule; in other words, breach of representation
may only be brought if the party relied on the representation as being a
part of the contract.171
Chancellor Strine also wrote the influential Cobalt decision within the
post-Gloucester line of cases, and in extensive dicta, his discussion of the
risk-allocative features of representations and warranties was illustrative.172 Specifically, the opinion gave effect to the risk-allocative function
of a representation as lessening a burden of verification of the representation and as a means to reduce costly due diligence.173 Chancellor Strine
has also demonstrated his stance towards sandbagging when applying
New York law to a pre-signing sandbagging claim.174 While the analysis
used did not require a specific holding on this issue, a lengthy footnote
discussed New York law in relation to the subsequent federal cases.175
Ultimately, the probative value of this case was that public policy considerations may be different depending on the timeframe in which the signing and closing occur, and the language of the opinion seems to be hostile
to recovery when the buyer suspects inaccuracy at the time of signing.176
Taken together, the opinions of Chancellor Strine, and their deference to
a contractarian view of breach of representation and warranty, signal that
a pro-sandbagging default rule is likely the side his vote will fall on.
But this conclusion that Eagle Force will adopt a contractarian approach to representations and warranties still does not resolve how Delaware will fit within, or adopt, the New York case law. As mentioned
167. See Gloucester Holding Corp. v. U.S. Tape & Sticky Prods., LLC, 832 A.2d 116,
127 (stating that “reliance is not an element,” even though the opposing party claimed that
the plaintiff had to prove that it was justified in relying on the evaluation material); see also
cases cited supra note 166 and accompanying text.
168. See Eagle Force, 187 A.3d at 1247; Cobalt, 2007 WL 2142926, at *27; In re IBP, Inc.
S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 82 n.200 (Del. Ch. 2001) (applying New York law in the
sandbagging situation where the buyer knows a provision is in breach prior to signing).
169. See Eagle Force, 187 A.3d at 1247 n.39 (citing Clough v. Cook, 87 A. 1017, 1018
(Del. Ch. 1913)).
170. Id.
171. See supra Part III (setting out the New York default position).
172. Cobalt, 2007 WL 2142926, at *27–28.
173. See id. at *28.
174. See In re IBP, Inc. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 82 n.200 (Del. Ch. 2001).
175. See id.
176. See id.
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above,177 there are several interpretations of New York law under the
Ziff-Davis line of cases.178 Furthermore, the majority’s opinion in Eagle
Force did not cite any of these cases or any other Ziff-Davis prodigy.179
But what Eagle Force did cite was a definitive part of Ziff-Davis that
couched “breach of express warranty as [an action] that is no longer
grounded in tort, but essentially in contract.”180 The parenthetical also
stated the general rule of Ziff-Davis that a party must have believed and
relied that the representation or warranty was “part of the bargain.”181
However, while citation to this part of Ziff-Davis is not dispositive for all
sandbagging claims,182 it does indicate that the rule out of Delaware will
likely mirror the Ziff-Davis rule, at least insofar as breach of warranty not
having a traditional reliance element.183
In summation, given the court’s reaffirmation of a contractarian approach to contracts, citation to and reasoning relating to Ziff-Davis, and
Chancellor Strine’s position in this and similar cases, Delaware is likely to
adopt a pro-sandbagging default rule that at least follows the Ziff-Davis
case but may go so far as requiring no reliance element like in the postGloucester cases. Furthermore, Delaware has yet to indicate how it will
adopt or reject the progeny of Ziff-Davis, but if Chancellor Strine’s opinion in a previous New York case could be extrapolated, it seems as if it
would not be fully adopted.184 Finally, it is worth noting that, while a prosandbagging rule is the likely outcome if the issue was squarely before the
court, some scholars have mentioned Delaware’s slow adoption of new
rules and changes that could delay a ruling for quite some time.185 Nevertheless, given the broad consensus that Delaware was a pro-sandbagging
state before Eagle Force and how the decision still fits within Delaware’s
much broader contractarian narrative, a future decision is likely to happen soon.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND STRATEGIES
Given the current unsettled nature of Delaware law, both the buyer
and seller in a transaction should not rely on silence for the issue of
sandbagging in an acquisition agreement. The following subsections will
recommend contractual language to use, depending on the side of the
177. See supra Part III.C.3.
178. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
179. See Eagle Force Holdings LLC, v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1236 n.185 (Del.
2018).
180. Id. (quoting CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ’g Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1000–01 (N.Y.
1990)).
181. See id.
182. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity of the ZiffDavis case).
183. See Eagle Force, 187 A.3d at 1236 n.185 (discussing the majority view as adopting
the New York line of cases).
184. See In re IBP, Inc. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 82 n.200 (Del. Ch. 2001).
185. See Hamermesh, supra note 128, at 1771 (recognizing the critique of Delaware
corporate law as being slow to evolve, but positing that this is due to “guiding jurisprudential conceptions” of finding the right law).
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transaction the party represents. The recommendations aim to help parties limit exposure to disputes given the current ambiguity in Delaware
law and also provide appropriate language, regardless of where the Supreme Court of Delaware draws the line for the default rule.
A. PRO-BUYER PROVISIONS
To protect their interest, a buyer should include a pro-sandbagging provision in its contract, regardless of how the Delaware court is likely to
come out on the issue.186 In doing so, the buyer protects its interests and
limits the ability of the seller to argue or successfully litigate their way out
of obligations in the case of a post-closing dispute arising.187 In addition,
an anti-waiver clause is important because a seller could argue that, in
lieu of renegotiating or creating a special indemnity, the buyer closed the
transaction and effectively waived its breach-of-contract claim.188 Such an
anti-waiver provision within the pro-sandbagging provision might read:
The representations, warranties, and covenants of the [Indemnifying
Party], and any right of [Indemnified Party] to indemnification secured under this Agreement with respect thereto, shall not be affected or deemed waived by reason of any knowledge, actual or
constructive, on the part of [Indemnified Party], or their respective
representatives, of the fact that any of [Indemnifying Party’s] representations, warranties, or covenants are, were, or might be inaccurate, as the case may be.189
Alternatively to closing, and regardless of the inclusion or omission of
a sandbagging provision, a buyer would be well advised to renegotiate the
indemnity for the allegedly inaccurate representations or warranties.190
Otherwise, the buyer faces the proposition that it knows the extent that
the indemnity cap will already have claims against it, and the transaction
may not be as attractive, especially considering that the buyer’s diligence
has already uncovered one inaccuracy.191

186. See Cole, supra note 116, at 455–56 (discussing the waiver issue and proposing an
anti-waiver provision under New York law to supplement the pro-sandbagging default
position).
187. See generally West, supra note 8 (making recommendations for buyers and sellers
for sandbagging and related provisions).
188. See West & Shah, supra note 23, at 4 (discussing the waiver defense that a seller
might argue).
189. For another example, see Purchase Agreement: Sandbagging and Anti-Sandbagging, PRAC. L. CORP. & SEC., https://www.westlaw.com/w-002-5153?view=hidealldrafting
notes&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 [Permalink unavailable] (last visited Sept. 14, 2019) [hereinafter Purchase Agreement] (proposing
an example of a pro-buyer sandbagging provision with guidance); see also Duran & Jamal,
supra note 12, at 1–2 (proposing a model sandbagging provision for buyers regardless of
the default rule selected by Delaware).
190. See West & Shah, supra note 23, at 7.
191. See id.
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B. PRO-SELLER PROVISIONS
Sellers, even under the previously assumed pro-sandbagging default,
have historically not included anti-sandbagging provisions in agreements.192 Instead, sellers have favored silence or adjusting the indemnity,
especially in light of the current seller’s market that has allowed caps at
or below 10% of the transaction.193 However, in the event that a seller
wished to protect itself from the sandbagging buyer, such a provision
could read:
[Seller] shall not be liable for any losses incurred under this Agreement based on or arising out of any inaccuracy in or breach of any of
the representations, warranties, or covenants of [Seller/the Company] contained in this Agreement if Buyer had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of such inaccuracy or breach prior to the Closing.194
Furthermore, a key issue the seller must consider when negotiating this
provision is the knowledge requirement.195 A buyer, not wanting to be
held liable under a constructive-knowledge theory, will likely push for not
only the exclusion of any knowledge limiting provision but also a narrowly defined knowledge standard.196 Hence, it is important for the seller
to favor a broadly constructed knowledge standard in order for the clause
to have the most preclusive effect on any claims that might arise postclosing.
V. CONCLUSION
While the current state of the law in Delaware is unsettled for how an
agreement will be construed when silent, parties are still free to and
should include their own sandbagging provisions.197 In spite of this current ambiguity, a prediction of a new default rule is tenable and is likely
to be some form of a pro-sandbagging rule. Furthermore, analysis of an
optimal rule under the penalty default framework yields the same result
as being efficient from a systematic standpoint. And both prediction and
justification, when paired with Delaware’s general contractarian approach to contracts, further reinforce the selection of a pro-sandbagging
default. In any case, only time will tell how the court will rule or if this
clause will become a nonissue with the rise in other recovery methods
192. See What’s Market Analytics, supra note 140 (showing that the incidence rate is
around 2% in Delaware); Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1086–87 (discussing the consistently
low anti-sandbagging incidence rate over four years).
193. Market Trends, supra note 28. The current market trend is for an indemnity clause
in roughly 96% of asset purchase agreements for deals totaling more than $100 million. Id.
Furthermore, roughly 87% of these indemnities included caps with an average cap of about
8% of the purchase price. Id.
194. For another example, see Purchase Agreement, supra note 189 (proposing an example of a pro-seller sandbagging provision with guidance).
195. See Cole, supra note 116, at 456 (recommending a buyer consider a knowledge
standard to govern the transaction).
196. See Duran & Jamal, supra note 12, at 1–2.
197. See supra Part V (discussing strategies for both buyers and sellers when negotiating sandbagging provisions).
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(such as RWI). In the meantime, both buyers and sellers should be wary
of a situation where sandbagging can occur and should prepare
accordingly.

